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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Corporate foundations (CF) are a specific subset of 
the broader group of foundations. They are 
designated by a corporation (founder firm) for a 
specific, expressed purpose (Anheier & Toepler, 
1999; Anheier & Leat, 2006) and are therefore under 
the formal or informal control of the founder firm 
(Westhues & Einwiller, 2006). 
Research has mainly focused on generic 
foundations, and empirical studies on CFs are still 
rare. Studies have noted the existence of different 
models of CFs (Minciullo & Pedrini, 2011), unpacked 
the relationship between founder firms and CFs 
(Brown et al., 2006; Petrovits, 2006; Westhues & 
Einwiller, 2006; Minciullo & Pedrini, 2015), and 
explored CFs’ impact on society (Herlin & Pedersen 
2013; Quinn et al., 2014; Qu & Osili, 2017). In this 
context, growing attention has been given to grant 
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The present research studies the grant-monitoring process in 
corporate foundations. This process represents a crucial activity 
because it influences both the effectiveness of grant 
implementation and the corporate foundation’s reputation. 
Despite this, specific literature is rare, especially regarding the 
antecedents of corporate foundations’ efforts in grant 
monitoring, project complexity, and corporate foundations. This 
paper is aimed at filling the literature gap by assessing the 
relationship between the (organizational) complexity of the 
financed project and the monitoring mechanisms put in place by 
corporate foundations around the world. The study surveyed 280 
projects granted by corporate foundations in the USA and Italy 
during 2014-2017. The sample included public information on 
monitoring activities of grantees for ten foundations—four based 
in Italy and six in the United States. 
For each corporate foundation (CF), I conducted a specific 
analysis of websites to collect all public information on 
monitoring activities published by these foundations (i.e. 
newsletters, policies and procedures, reports of projects), 
developing a database of communicational units. Data were 
analyzed using a hierarchical linear regression analysis, starting 
from a base model and analyzing the differences in adjusted R2. 
This study reveals that, in corporate foundations, the intensity of 
grant monitoring depends on project complexity. In particular, in 
Italy, monitoring depends on the number of involved institutions 
and, in the USA, on both the number of involved institutions and 
the number of locations of the project. Further ideas for research 
about corporate foundations are offered. 
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monitoring, which has so far not been explored in 
the literature with specific reference to CFs. 
Grant monitoring is the process that CFs, and 
philanthropic foundations in general, adopt to 
assess granted projects (Patton, 1999, 2011; 
Coffman et al., 2013; Patrizi & Thompson, 2011; 
Coffman & Beer, 2016; Beadnell et al., 2017; 
Greenwald, 2013). Grant monitoring is gaining 
importance among CFs because it can influence both 
the effectiveness of grant implementation (Delfin & 
Tang, 2008) and a CF’s reputation (Ostrower, 2006). 
Despite this, to the best of the authors’ 
knowledge, there is a general lack of studies on the 
antecedents of CFs’ efforts in grant monitoring. This 
paper aims to fill this gap by assessing the 
relationship between the (organizational) complexity 
of the financed project and the monitoring 
mechanisms put in place by CFs. The objective of 
the paper is to provide an answer to the following 
question: what are the antecedents of grant-
monitoring mechanisms in CFs? I also aim to 
provide to managers of CFs useful insights in 
assessing the necessary efforts to monitor a project 
and better allocate resources to such activities. 
To address the relationship between the nature 
of a project and its monitoring, I surveyed 280 
projects granted by CFs in the USA and Italy. 
Through content analysis of the websites and 
reports from the CFs, I examined whether a 
relationship exists between the complexity of a 
granted project and the efforts of the CF in grant 
monitoring. 
The paper is structured as follows: in the next 
section, I organize and present the existing literature 
on the specific features of CFs and their monitoring 
activities. The methodology section details the 
design of the research and the variables considered, 
followed by the results section, which presents the 
output of the tests conducted and the significance of 
identified relationships. The paper ends with a 
discussion of the results, and with conclusions, in 
which I outline the contribution to existing theory 
and the insights that can be offered to practitioners. 
What are the antecedents of grant-monitoring 
mechanisms in corporate foundations? Does grant-
monitoring mechanism in corporate foundations 
depend on the organizational complexity of granted 
projects? What are the differences between Italian 
and USA corporate foundations? 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
CFs are non-profit entities established by 
corporations (Westhues & Einwiller, 2006). They are 
different from other foundations for three reasons: 
1) they depend on a firm for funding, 2) they have 
close ties with this firm, and 3) they nearly always 
have corporate executives as members of their 
boards of directors. Grant-making CFs are a subset 
of these, which provide financing for social 
investment projects outsourced to other 
organizations (Anheier & Toepler, 1999; Anheier & 
Leat, 2006; Petrovits, 2006; McElroy, 2012). 
The typical work of all grant-making CFs 
includes grant monitoring. In fact, CFs are under 
pressure to explain the impact of their grants on 
society, and there has been an improvement in 
scrutiny in response to demands for accountability 
(Ostrower, 2004, 2006). Monitoring typically focuses 
on how project funds have been used and whether 
key project activities have been completed 
(Greenwald, 2013). In the specific context of CFs, 
grant monitoring also aims to assess individual 
grants, investigate how granted money has been 
used, and determine whether recipients have 
achieved the promised results (European Foundation 
Centre, 2005; Matessich, 2012). Grant monitoring 
requires a specific investment of financial resources, 
time, and competences of the CF, but also 
substantial acceptance and participation by the 
grantee (Ostrower, 2006). 
Earlier literature on grant monitoring has 
mainly studied the difficulties and conditions of an 
effective grant-monitoring process (Coffman et al., 
2013; Britt & Coffman, 2012; Behn, 2003; Benjamin, 
2013; Greenwald, 2013; Coffman et al., 2013). There 
is currently a general lack of knowledge on the 
antecedents of monitoring efforts, even more so for 
CFs. Previous studies on philanthropic foundations 
have discussed the typology of grants as an 
antecedent of monitoring efforts (Britt & Coffman, 
2012); CFs cannot use the same evaluation process 
for every grant, given the fundamental differences 
between place-based grants (Grantmakers for 
Effective Organizations, 2014), advocacy grants 
(Beer & Reed, 2009), capacity-building grants, and 
operating grants (Brest, 2003), which require varied 
approaches and frameworks (Scherer, 2015). 
In contrast, project complexity as an 
antecedent of monitoring efforts by philanthropic 
foundations and CFs has not been studied. Project 
complexity is a critical project dimension that has 
been examined in the project management literature. 
Lu et al. (2015) reported that projects have grown in 
both quantity and complexity, and measuring 
project complexity has, therefore, become an 
integral part of project management. Baccarini 
(1996) defined project complexity in terms of 
differentiation (the number of different elements, 
e.g. tasks, specialists, locations) and 
interdependence or connectivity (the degree of 
interrelatedness between those elements), and 
distinguished two kinds of project complexity: 
organizational and technological. Ribbers and Schoo 
(2002) defined project complexity along three 
dimensions: variety, variability, and integration. 
Monitoring efforts for granted projects are 
directly related to three main factors: 
 The number and typology of the actors that 
conduct the grant monitoring, such as foundation 
personnel, consultants, founding corporation 
personnel, and volunteers. 
 The number of controls made on the grantee 
and project, including financial controls (Greenlee & 
Trussel, 2000; Ritchie & Kolodinsky, 2003), such as 
the number of locations of the project, the amount 
of the grant already spent, the number of persons 
and institutions involved in the project, the number 
of services offered, and the number of beneficiaries 
(Alkin & Christie, 2004). 
 The number of visits to the granted project 
conducted by the foundation (Dowie, 1995). 
Corporate foundations are important, also in 
Europe (Westhues & Einwiller, 2006). Nevertheless, 
the existing literature is not so wide, especially the 
studies concerning their operating mechanisms.  
In particular, at the moment, there is a general 
lack of knowledge on the antecedents of their 
monitoring efforts. Previous studies, in fact, have 
discussed the typology of grants as an antecedent of 
monitoring efforts (Britt & Coffman, 2012), but not 
the organizational complexity of granted projects as 
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an antecedent of grant-monitoring mechanisms. 
Furthermore, in the previous literature of CFs, there 
are no comparative studies on this topic. 
This paper offers a contribution to the existing 
literature for three reasons: 1) it is specifically 
focused on corporate foundations, and not in 
general on philanthropic foundations; 2) it is 
focused on the specific topic of the grant-monitoring 
mechanisms, and in particular, on their antecedents 
(not explored by the previous literature on CFs); 3) it 
offers a comparative study between the USA and 
Italian CFs, rare in the existing literature. 
 
3.  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1. Procedure and sample 
 
I started by identifying the ten biggest grant-making 
CFs in Italy and the United States, based on the total 
value of grants in 2014-2017. 
I have considered US CFs because they 
represent in the world the most important corporate 
foundations in terms of total value of grants given 
to projects, and at the same time, they are the 
corporate foundations with the longest experience in 
terms of operating mechanisms, especially grant-
monitoring mechanisms. On the other hand, I have 
chosen Italian corporate foundations because: 
1) they are a relevant phenomenon in Europe; 
2) their grant-monitoring mechanisms are very 
similar to those used by US CFs (in fact, many Italian 
CFs have been implemented and modeled on the US 
experience of corporate foundations); 3) at the same 
time, they are different from US CFs, in terms of 
value of grants (Italian CFs have a smaller total value 
of grants than US CFs). 
I have chosen the ten biggest corporate 
foundations because these foundations, both in Italy 
and USA: 1) represent more than 30% of the total 
amount (and projects) granted by the Italian and US 
corporate foundations, and 2) they support many 
big projects. 
Then, for each CF, I conducted a specific 
analysis of websites to collect all public information 
on monitoring activities. The decision to focus 
attention on public information, rather than conduct 
a set of interviews with members of CFs, was related 
to the fact that grant-making foundations do not 
always open their internal processes to study, thus 
reducing the opportunity for primary research on 
their decision making (Diaz, 2001). This choice 
imposed the limitation that foundations that did not 
provide public information on specific projects or 
specific monitoring systems were not considered in 
the final sample. The final sample included public 
information on monitoring activities of grantees for 
ten foundations—four based in Italy and six in the 
United States. 
Starting in April 2014, I reviewed the websites 
of targeted CFs daily to collect data on projects 
conducted in 2014-2017. I collected all documents 
published by these foundations (i.e. newsletters, 
policies and procedures, reports of projects), 
developing a database of communicational units. 
I content analyzed the collected documents to 
codify information about monitoring activities 
related to every project. The coding process was 
undertaken by three different coders: two working 
as primary coders and the third as a secondary. 
Initially, the two primary coders separately analyzed 
the documents to code monitoring activities for each 
project. In cases of differences in codification, the 
secondary researcher checked the report and 
decided between the two to ensure reliability. 
At the end of data collection, a total of 280 
grant projects were considered: 102 from Italian 
foundations and 178 from United States 
foundations. Of those projects, 126 referred to 
initiatives realized in the United States, 98 in Italy, 
and 36 in other countries. 
Table 1 shows the final sample for the analysis, 
specifying the issues addressed by the activities of 
each CF and the size of the organization in terms of 
annual giving and the number of projects analyzed. 
 
Table 1. The sample 
 
No. Country Main issues addressed Annual giving (€,000) 
No. of 
projects 
     
1 United States Human rights protection, poverty alleviation, social safety 105,014 30 
2 United States Human rights protection 49,458 28 
3 United States 
Educational development, environmental protection, poverty 
alleviation 
49,458 30 
4 United States Disaster relief, poverty alleviation, social safety 43,360 30 
5 United States 
Disaster relief, education development, environmental protection, 
human rights protection 
27,100 30 
6 Italy 
Educational development, environmental protection, health 
services, social services 
7,500 18 
7 Italy Health services, social services 6,800 24 
8 Italy Health services, social services 5,100 30 
9 Italy Health services, social services 5,065 30 
10 United States 
Education development, environmental protection, health services, 
poverty alleviation 
4,810 30 
     
No. of analyzed projects 280 
Italy 102 
United States 178 
 
3.2. Measures 
 
Given the relative novelty of the analysis, I used 
measures derived from an initial exploratory 
investigation to understand the relationship between 
monitoring strength and project complexity. Prior to 
data gathering, I conducted a two-year experimental 
analysis based on exploratory interviews with 
primary officers of CFs, based on which I identified 
the antecedents of monitoring systems that I 
included in the current analysis: monitoring 
strength, involved organizations, involved locations, 
offered services, project length, and grant value. 
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Monitoring strength. Starting from the results 
of the exploratory interviews, I measured the 
strength of controls using a scale with four items: 1) 
number of issues controlled within the grantee 
institution, based on a six-issue list compiled from 
previous works (Grenlee & Trussel, 2000); 2) number 
of issues controlled within the project, based on a 
list of eight possible issues (Baccarini, 1996); 
3) intensity of control activities, measured on a 
discrete scale based on the number of 
subjects/institutions implementing monitoring 
activities; and 4) frequency of monitoring activities, 
measured as the number of reports and visits. 
To construct the variable monitoring strength, I 
conducted a principal component factor analysis 
(KMO = 0.551; Bartlett’s p = 0.001; determinant 
> 0.141). The loading values of the four dimensions 
were positive and all greater than the significant 
value of 0.40 (institutional issues = 0.936; project 
issues = 0.789; intensity = 0.543; frequency = 0.831). 
I also verified the reliability of the scale using 
Cronbach’s alpha, which was acceptable (α = 0.92). 
Involved organizations. The main independent 
variable was a count of the number of institutions 
involved in the project with the granting foundation. 
I considered all the organizations (profit, non-profit, 
or governmental) that collaborated on the project. I 
constructed this indicator based on the idea that the 
more organizations involved in a project, the more 
complex the project will be to monitor (i.e. 
organizational complexity; Baccarini, 1996). The 
value of this indicator is 1 when a project is 
implemented only by the organization that receives 
the grant but is more when other organizations are 
included. 
Involved locations. This second independent 
variable represented a count of the number of 
locations included in the project and measured the 
geographical extent of the services and programs in 
the specific project. The measure was based on the 
idea that the more locations included in the project, 
the higher the organizational complexity of the 
process (Baccarini, 1996). 
Offered services. This was the number of 
services offered by the granted project. Services 
were a unit defined as a combination of provider 
and recipient. A higher number of offered services 
could imply a higher organizational complexity and 
could increase the monitoring activities. 
Project length. The length of the project was 
measured as the number of six-month periods from 
the initial financing to the end of the granting of the 
project. The length of a project was included as a 
monitoring variable because it impacts on the ability 
to efficiently manage the project and organize its 
activities. 
Grant value. This was a measure of the size of 
the grant in terms of value granted by the CF to the 
project, measured in thousands of euros. 
 
3.3. Data analysis 
 
Data were analyzed using a hierarchical linear 
regression analysis, starting from a base model and 
analysing the differences in adjusted R2. In step one 
I entered monitoring variables in the base model. In 
step two, I added the independent variables. I used 
the sign of the unstandardized coefficients to 
determine the relationships. The hierarchical 
regression analysis was first applied to the total 
sample, including all 280 analyzed projects; the 
analysis was then replicated with the data gathered 
from CFs based in Italy and the United States 
separately. The base model analyzed the monitoring 
variables, while Models 1, 2, and 3 considered the 
effects of the independent variables of the total 
sample, Italy, and the United States, respectively. 
The regression analyses were controlled for 
issues related to multicollinearity and 
homoscedasticity. Addressing issues of 
multicollinearity, I verified that variance inflation 
factors of all the variables included in the regression 
were greater than one. For homoscedasticity, I 
verified the graphical distribution of plot P-P, which 
was normal. 
 
4.  RESULTS 
 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics and a 
correlation matrix for all variables included. 
 
 
Table 2. Means, standard deviations, and correlations 
 
Variables 
Total Italy United States Total 
M SD M SD M SD 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Offered services 1.25 0.80 1.57 1.21 1.07 0.25 0.08 0.10 0.24** 0.05 0.25** 
2. Project length 1.50 0.83 1.78 0.78 1.34 0.82  0.18** 0.06 0.14* 0.31** 
3. Grant value (,000) 308.02 530.15 320.57 400.10 361.07 630.60   0.18** 0.30** 0.20** 
4. Involved locations 1.43 1.51 1.89 2.28 1.17 0.64    0.30** 0.24** 
5. Involved 
institutions 
1.15 0.69 1.20 0.88 1.13 0.55     0.54** 
6. Monitoring strength 0.00 1.00 0.55 1.43 -0.32 0.37      
Note: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01 
 
A closer look at the descriptive statistics 
revealed differences between foundations based in 
Italy and the United States. Italian foundations were 
mainly granting projects with higher organizational 
complexity than those observed in US foundations. 
The Italian projects were characterized by a higher 
number of offered services than those observed in 
the US, which generally offered only one service. 
Italian foundations were granting projects for a 
longer duration and with a higher number of 
locations than US foundations. 
The monitoring strength observed in Italy and 
the United States was also different. Italian 
foundations showed high mean monitoring strength, 
but with a material standard deviation that 
suggested that the strength of monitoring was 
different between the projects supported by these 
foundations. US foundations showed lower 
monitoring strength with a significantly smaller 
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standard deviation. The first result of our study is 
the observation that US foundations were less 
confident in the strength of project monitoring than 
Italian foundations. 
Table 2 shows that some variables were 
correlated, but no critically collinear variables 
existed in the data (r < 0.60). As expected, all the 
measures were significantly and positively 
correlated with the monitoring strength. However, 
the correlation between the number of involved 
locations and the number of involved institutions 
was positive. 
Table 3 shows the results of ordinary least 
squares regression models of the relationship 
between monitoring strength, involved locations, 
and institutions. For each country, the base model 
included only the monitoring variables, and the 
second added the independent variables. 
 
 
Table 3. Results of linear regression predicting monitoring strength 
 
Variable 
Total Italy United States 
Base model Model 1 Base model Model 2 Base model Model 3 
       
Independent       
 Involved locations  -0.00  -0.04  0.27** 
 Involved institutions  0.89**  1.20**  0.13** 
       
Control       
 Offered services 0.27** 0.26** 0.10 0.11 0.03 0.03 
 Project length 0.33** 0.27** 0.15 0.15 0.12** 0.17** 
 Grant value 0.10** 0.10 0.10** 0.10 0.10** 0.10** 
       
Constant -0.91** -1.72** -0.21 -1.24** -0.64** -1.09** 
       
R2 0.16 0.50 0.10 0.56 0.43 0.73 
∆R2  0.34  0.46  0.30 
       
F 18.43 56.38 4.75 27.16 45.36 96.54 
∆F  37.95  22.41  51.19 
Note: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01 
 
I began with the analysis of all projects in the data 
and then proceeded to separate analyses of the two 
countries. The base model included the monitoring 
variables; despite showing significant positive 
coefficients, the model explained little of the 
monitoring complexity (R2 = 0.16, F = 18.43). Model 1 
showed the results of including the independent 
variables in the regression and indicated that the 
monitoring strength of the granted project was 
significantly increased with greater numbers of 
involved institutions. For all the projects in the two 
countries, only the involved institutions showed a 
significantly positive coefficient. Model 1 
significantly improved the adjusted R2, which 
increased to 0.50 with an improvement of 0.34. 
Separating the data between Italy and the US, 
the model conserved this predictive value. In both, 
the introduction of independent variables produced 
a significant improvement in adjusted R2, increasing 
to 0.56 in the Italian-based analysis, an increase of 
0.46, and to 0.73 in the US analysis, an increase 
of 0.30. 
The results showed different situations in Italy 
and the United States. In Italy, the only significant 
dependent variable was the number of involved 
institutions, with a positive coefficient of 1.21. In the 
US, both the dependent variables were significant, 
showing that monitoring strength was positively 
related to the numbers of both involved institutions 
(0.27) and locations (0.13). 
Regarding the monitoring variables, the models 
indicated that the granted value was not a 
significant predictor of the monitoring strength, 
because in all models analyzed, it showed a 
coefficient close to zero. This is an interesting result 
that indicates that monitoring strength was not 
strictly related to the financial value of the grant, 
but was related to other dimensions of the projects. 
I also found that project length was correlated with 
monitoring strength only among US foundations, 
indicating that, in this country, the more long-term a 
project’s involvement with a foundation, the greater 
the foundation’s efforts in monitoring the project. 
 
5.  DISCUSSION  
 
This study reveals that, in CFs, the intensity of grant 
monitoring depends on project complexity and, in 
particular, the organizational dimension. In Italy, 
monitoring depends on the number of involved 
institutions and, in the USA, on both the number of 
involved institutions and the number of locations of 
the project. 
The results confirm that CFs do not use the 
same monitoring processes for all grants (Beer & 
Reed, 2009; Teles & Schmitt, 2011; Brest, 2003; 
Scherer, 2015). Monitoring efforts are based not just 
on the value or nature of the granted project (Beer & 
Reed, 2009; Brest, 2003; Scherer, 2015), but also on 
the specific organizational complexity of each 
project. Our results indicate that, when granted 
projects involve many locations and involved 
institutions, the granter increases monitoring 
efforts. These results are consistent with 
contingency-based research, which has a long 
tradition in the study of management control 
systems (Chenhall, 2003). 
The research findings are also in accordance 
with the existing literature on project complexity. As 
indicated by Baccarini (1996), complexity makes a 
difference in the management of projects: certain 
project characteristics provide a basis for 
determining the appropriate managerial actions 
required to complete and monitor a project 
successfully. As projects become more complex, 
there is increasing concern about project complexity 
and its influence upon the project management 
process. According to Morris et al. (1987), complex 
projects demand an exceptional level of 
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management, and the application of conventional 
systems developed for ordinary projects may not be 
appropriate for complex projects. Our results open a 
new stream of research on the antecedents of 
monitoring and mean that CFs could simultaneously 
implement different monitoring systems and 
different degrees of effort. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
The research presented in this paper opens many 
opportunities for further development around the 
topic of monitoring within non-profit organizations. 
Our results show that monitoring strength varies 
between different projects in the same organization, 
but I did not explore the relationship between the 
strength of monitoring and the effectiveness of 
individual projects. Further research could unpack 
this relationship to better understand the impact of 
monitoring efforts as an antecedent of project 
effectiveness. 
The second stream of research that could be 
initiated from this study is understanding the 
relationship between experience and strength of 
monitoring. Further research could verify whether a 
previous relationship between the CF and a specific 
non-profit entity may impact monitoring efforts. The 
last aspect emerging from the present research, 
which has not been studied in the literature on CFs, 
is the question of whether the monitoring strength 
applied to a granted project has a positive or a 
negative impact on both the CF’s reputation and the 
founder corporation’s reputation, in both the short 
and long terms. When a CF, for whatever reason, 
increases the strength of monitoring of a granted 
project, it is probable that, in the short term, the 
grantee becomes less happy. However, this 
sentiment may change, and in many cases does, 
during the partnership. Judgments of the CF’s 
approach, and of the corporation, at the end of the 
partnership usually depend on the positive learning 
impact on the grantee generated by the monitoring 
process. There are currently no specific studies that 
explore monitoring strength as an antecedent of 
corporate and CF reputations. 
The present research has some limitations that 
could impact the generalizability of results. First is 
the limited sample, both in terms of number of CFs 
included in the study and in geographical scope (US 
and Italian CFs). Second, a longitudinal study is 
needed to better understand the evolution of 
monitoring; the present research focused on only 
three years of observations. Third, I used only public 
data, and insights from management would help to 
provide a better understanding of monitoring. 
Fourth, I was unable to collect all necessary control 
variables for the projects. Not all agreed indicators 
for assessing project effectiveness, the nature of the 
relationship between the corporate founder and the 
grantee, the frequency of meetings between partners 
and the CF, and the characteristics of coordination 
mechanisms between CFs and grantees, were found. 
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